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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the developing jurisprudence on the right of a patient to 
refuse medical treatment on religious grounds, and considers the extent to which 
these refusals should be honoured. 
The paper begins by outlining the rights of the religious patient to refuse medical 
treatment and to manifest their religious beliefs. It goes on to critically analyse 
the scope of these rights as defined by the courts and the legislature. Both the 
right of the adult patient to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds and 
the ambit of a parent's right to refuse medical treatment on behalf of a minor 
child are considered. The paper then looks at the state interests that might justify 
overriding a treatment refusal made on religious grounds. Suggestions are then 
made about the resolution of the conflicts between the individual rights and 
state interests outlined in this paper, with particular reference to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
In the conclusion of this paper, it is submitted that the principle of self-
determination should apply at first instance to the decision of a religious patient 
to refuse medical treatment. Thus, there is a presumption that these decisions 
ought to be honoured. This presumption may be rebutted in appropriate cases, 
but it must be emphasised that the role of the state in restricting a person's liberty 
this way ought to be limited to cases where this is necessary to protect the 
freedom of other individuals. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 16,000 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of religious affiliation, most people choose to submit to medical 
treatment when they are ill or injured. Commonly, even token religious 
believers will also appeal to prayer in the hope that this will assist recovery. 
In a sense then, a great many of us can be considered to be part time faith 
healers.1 However, some religious sects2 believe that, in some or all 
circumstances, 'treatment' should proceed solely according to prayer and 
reliance on their faith. 
While it is sometimes said of these contrasting opinions that 'one person's 
heresy may be another's orthodoxy'; in New Zealand's pluralist society, 
toleration of differences in conviction is encouraged. Consequently, the law 
allows people the freedom to manifest their religious beliefs and the 
freedom to make their own choices about whether to submit to medical 
treatment. However, these freedoms are not absolute. This paper examines 
the developing jurisprudence on the right of the religious patient to refuse 
medical treatment, and considers the extent to which these refusals should 
be honoured. 
The problem of balancing the conflicting interests of the state and the 
individual arises most acutely in cases where the likely consequence of a 
treatment refusal is the death of a salvageable patient. This is commonly the 
case where a Jehovah's Witness refuses a blood transfusion. For this reason 
the focus of this paper is on treatment in the life or death situation. 
Chapter II of the paper considers the rights of the religious patient to refuse 
medical treatment and to manifest their religious beliefs. In this section, the 
religious patient's rights to religious liberty and to refuse medical treatment 
1 
2 
I have borrowed this suggestion from the introduction to I Dwight "State Interference 
with Religiously Motivated Decisions on Medical Treatment" (1988) 93 Dickinson 
Law Review 41. 
The most publicised treatment refusals on religious grounds involve Christian 
Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses. Christian Scientists rely solely on prayer and 
spiritual healing. Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood transfusions because they believe 
that it violates a biblical injunction against eating blood: See, in particular Acts 15: 
28-29, Genesis 9: 3-4, Leviticus 17: 10-14, and Deuteronomy 12: 23-25. Jehovah's 
Witnesses draw no distinction between taking blood into the mouth and taking it into 
the blood vessels. Receiving a blood transfusion is considered to be an unpardonable 
sin which results in the withdrawal of the opportunity to attain eternal life. 
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are examined. Chapters III and IV then outline the scope of these rights as 
defined by the courts and the legislature. Chapter III looks at the right of the 
adult patient to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds and Chapter 
IV discusses the ambit of a parent's right to refuse medical treatment on 
behalf of a minor child. Chapter V then outlines the state interests that 
might justify overriding a treatment refusal made on religious grounds. 
The penultimate chapter considers how conflicts between the individual 
rights and state interests outlined in this paper might be resolved, with 
particular reference to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("the 
NZBORA"). 
In the conclusion of this paper, it is submitted that the principle of self-
determination should prima facie apply to the decision of a religious patient 
to refuse medical treatment. Thus, there is a presumption that these 
decisions ought to be honoured. This presumption may be rebutted in 
appropriate cases. However, the role of the state in restricting a person's 
liberty this way ought to be limited to cases where state action is necessary to 
protect the freedom of other individuals. 
3 
II THE RIGHTS OF THE RELIGIOUS PATIENT 
Today, many legal and ethical issues are framed in rights language. Usually, 
rights terminology is used to refer to standards of behaviour which it is 
thought of as wrong not to abide by. According to the Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary,3 a right is a justiciable claim on legal or moral grounds 
to have or obtain something or to act in a certain way. According to this 
broad definition, rights may refer to 'fundamentals' which represent some 
kind of underlying morality; but they may also have their basis in statutory 
creation or arise from the customs of a particular society. 
The moral force of arguments based upon rights is often assumed. Yet rights 
sceptics dismiss the idea that rights have any moral status and the dilemma 
of defining a right is a perennial problem for jurists. For the purposes of this 
paper, we can put to one side the question of whether rights can exist 
independent of legal or social recognition. Perhaps we can do no better than 
Socrates, who described morality as "no small matter, but how we ought to 
live".4 Thus, rights may be viewed as expressions of what a particular society 
thinks important at a particular time; circumscribing the foundation of the 
way we ought to live. This definition of rights is adopted for the purposes of 
the discussion which follows. 
If rights are only as significant as the reasons behind the use of the label, we 
must then analyse their content in order to determine their relative 
importance. This chapter begins by defining the term 'religious patient'. It 
then outlines the rights of the religious patient to religious liberty and to 
refuse medical treatment. 
A "Religious Patient" 
A "religious patient" is a religious person who is undergoing medical 
treatment, or would be undergoing medical treatment but for a refusal to 
3 
4 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1950) vol 1, 
1831. 
As reported by Plato, in Plato The Republic (translated by G M A Grube) (Hackett 
Publishing Co, Indianapolis, 1973). 
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consent.5 This definition of a religious patient begs the question "what does 
it mean to be 'religious'?" or, more precisely "what is a 'religion'?" This has 
proved a difficult question for the judiciary. 
Generally, to be considered religious, one must have a particular system of 
faith and worship. But what qualifies as "a system of faith and worship"? In 
the Western world, it is said that characteristically, religious beliefs have a 
lot to do with matters such as the existence and one's relationship with a 
supreme being; one's relationship with other human beings and the 
environment; the nature of human existence; one's place in this world; 
where people go when their life on Earth is over and how they can get 
there.6 
Religious beliefs typically make reference to basic limitations on human life. 
In an important sense, religion is about 'the meaning of life' in as far as it is 
to do with:7 
(i) describing and explaining the human condition at its most 
fundamental level; 
(ii) providing a person with a unique concept of personal identity; 
and 
(iii) assisting people to make sense of themselves and the world 
that they live in. 
However, there is a danger that choosing a substantive definition of the 
word religion along the lines set out in the above paragraphs will be too 
narrow. Any definition must strive to include unconventional religions 
within its ambit and must avoid any majoritarian bias. Thus, religious 
liberty calls for a wide reading of the word 'religion'. It would be suggestive 
of religious intolerance if religious liberty was denied to a group with 
5 
6 
7 
As the focus of this paper is the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment on 
religious grounds, I do not consider the rights of religious patients to manifest their 
beliefs in other ways. I do not discuss issues such as whether these patients have a 
right to meet with members of their church. These difficulties are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
M J Wreen "Autonomy, Religious Values and Refusal of Lifesaving Medical 
Treatment" (1991) 17 Journal of Medical Ethics 124, 128. 
Aboven6. 
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unorthodox opinions on medical treatment by not defining that group as a 
religion.8 
In the United States case of State v Miskimens,9 the Ohio State Court held 
that a statutory provision which drew a distinction between conventional 
and unconventional religions was unconstitutional.10 The provision that 
was called into question in the Miskimens case provided an exception to a 
parent's duty not to create a substantial risk to the health or safety of a child, 
where the parent treats the child's illness according to the tenets of a 
'recognised' religious body. The court found that the provision was too 
vague to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, it was held that by 
limiting the exception to the followers of recognised religions, the state 
became:11 
hopelessly involved ... in questions that should not be the subject of governmental 
inquisition. 
Thus, any definition of religion should be drafted widely, so that minority 
religions are protected to the same degree as established religions. In 
addition to this, the definition of religion should also be narrow enough to 
be meaningful. The attempts of the United States Supreme Court and the 
High Court of Australia to follow these guidelines might justifiably lead 
some to the conclusion that there is no substantive definition of religion 
which is not irreducibly subjective. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
St John Robilliard Religion and the Law (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1984) ix. See also United States v Seeger (1965) 380 US 163, 176; Welsh v United 
States (1970) 398 US 333, 339 and Church of the New Faith (1983) 57 ALJR 785, 789. 
(1984) 490 NE 2d 931, 933-938. 
The Ohio Rev Code Ann para 2929. 22 (A) Baldwin (1986) provided that "No person, 
who is the parent... of a child under eighteen ... shall create a substantial risk to the 
health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care ... when the parent treats 
the ... illness or defect of the child by spiritual means through prayer alone, in 
accordance with the tenets of a recognised religious body". 
Above n 9, 934. The decision of the court in State v Miskimens acknowledged that the 
determination of what is a recognised religion would excessively entangle church and 
state by requiring the courts to answer such questions as what is a recognised religion, 
by whom must it be recognised, what are its tenets and did the parent act in 
accordance with them? The Miskimens court followed a similar line of reasoning to 
that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in cases where the Supreme Court 
ruled that the courts should not inquire into the validity of religious beliefs: See 
Lemon v Kurtzman (1971) 403 US 602, 613 and Walz v Tax Commission (1970) 397 US 
664,674. 
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In United States v Seeger,12 the Supreme Court said that religion includes:13
 
[A] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place 
parallel to that filled by God ... 
The Seeger test for determining whether a sincere and meaningful belief is 
held is subjective. It simply involves an inquiry into:14 
whether the beliefs [of the person claiming to be religious] are sincerely held and 
whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious. 
The Seeger test was explained in Welsh v United States,15 where a plurality 
of the court held that "his own scheme of things" indicated:16 
that the central consideration in determining whether ... beliefs are religious is 
whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a religion in [the 
believer's] life. 
The subjectivist-functionalist approach17 espoused by the United States 
Supreme Court has not been followed in the High Court of Australia. In 
Church of the New Faith,18 the court set out a two-part test to determine 
whether a person is religious. First, there is a requirement that a person 
must have a belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and 
secondly, there must be acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give 
effect to that belief.19 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Aboven8. 
Above n 12, 176. 
Above n 12, 185. 
(1970) 398 us 333. 
Above n 15,339. 
I adopt the terminology used by Sadurski in W Sadurski "On Legal Definitions of 
Religion" (1989) 63 ALJ 835, 836. 
(1983) 57 ALJR 785, 791. 
The test that the High Court proposed in Church of the New Faith has been 
criticised for emphasis on the supernatural. Sadurski suggests that it is unclear 
whether this is an appropriate criterion for a group to be considered a religion and 
says that the "superficially innocuous demand that religions appeal to the 
7 
Arguably, neither the subjective formulation of the United States Supreme 
Court nor that of the High Court of Australia is sufficiently narrow to be 
meaningful and, at the same time, sufficiently broad to encompass minority 
religions. It may be concluded that it is impossible to define religion.20 In 
this case, how do we decide to whom religious liberty is guaranteed? 
Sadurski concludes that a subjective definition of religion should not be 
spurned because both 'religious' and non-religious beliefs, if sincerely held 
by individuals as the motivating grounds of their actions, call for legal 
protection in a liberal and secular state.21 Sadurski's compelling logic 
appears to be reflected in section 15 of the NZBORA, which grants equal 
protection to those who wish to manifest religious or non-religious 
beliefs,22 so the distinction between religious and non-religious beliefs 
becomes to some extent academic.23 For this reason, it does not seem 
necessary to unduly limit our definition of religion and, for the purpose of 
this paper, a wide (and therefore subjective) definition is proposed. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a subjective definition of religion is to be used 
in this paper, important distinctions can still be made between the religious 
patient and either the suicidal or the voluntary euthanasia patient. People 
who intend to commit suicide, for whatever reason, have the direct object 
in mind of procuring their own death. The voluntary euthanasia patient 
may wish to die in order to stop suffering. But a fundamental difference 
exists in the case of the religious patient. Religious patients do not want to 
die. Their objection to medical treatment follows from a desire to adhere to 
20 
21 
22 
23 
supernatural may be under-inclusive and may leave some 'religions' outside the 
limits of judicial protection. But, at the same time, it may prove over-inclusive". 
This was the position that was argued by G C Freeman "The Misconceived Search for 
the Constitutional Definition of 'Religion"' (1983) 71 Georgetown LJ 1519. 
Sadurski, above n 17, 843. See also N L Cantor Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying 
(Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1987) 24: "Normally, 
religious scruples are not regarded as any more sancrosanct against government 
interference than any other philosophical or religious scruples". 
See below, text ton 29. 
Religious rights may have been accorded special significance because of the 
historical need not to confuse the church with the state and to ensure that religious 
diversity was acknowledged and accepted. This is evidenced in James Madison's plea 
that: "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for 
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the 
other in the multiplicity of sects": Clinton Rossiter (ed) The Federalist Papers 
(Mentor, New York, 1961) Nos 10 and 51 (James Madison). The need to ensure the 
separation of church and state is no longer pressing and there may be no need to draw 
sharp distinctions between true religious beliefs and the disparate ways that people 
reasonably form their conscience. 
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the tenets of a particular religion; the desire to manifest their beliefs. 
Although this desire may cause death, the religious patient wants to live.24 
Both the suicidal patient and the voluntary euthanasia patient have a 
specific intention to die when they refuse medical treatment. The religious 
patient wants to live, and cannot be said to have this intention.25 
In addition to this, the religious convictions of a patient might explain a 
decision which otherwise might seem irrational. Ordinarily, refusing 
medical treatment, where such refusal could threaten a person's life or 
health, could be considered to be a deprecation of life, where it is thought 
that there is no reason that motivates this action. Society can more easily 
appreciate that a person might have a reasonable cause to refuse medical 
treatment if this is based on the tenets of a particular religion, than if 
treatment is refused by a patient who believes that, for example, because the 
world is flat - treatment is unnecessary. 
B Religious Liberty 
Patients who refuse to submit to medical treatment on religious grounds 
may argue that this decision should be honoured because they have a right 
to religious liberty. While there is no right to freedom of religion or belief 
at common law,26 religious liberty has long been recognised as a necessary 
freedom in a free and democratic society.27 It comprises both the freedom to 
adopt and hold religious opinions28 and the right to manifest one's religion. 
The second of these two rights encompasses the right to refuse medical 
treatment on religious grounds. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321,332, where Robins JA made the same 
distinction. This decision is commented upon below, text ton 68. 
It could be said that the religious patient would rather die than not adhere to 
religious beliefs and that the patient intends to die for those beliefs, but this 
argument is not convincing. See Cantor, above n 21, 47. 
See Grace Bible Church v Reedman (1984) 54 ALR 571. 
The freedom to choose and practice a particular religion has been regarded as a 
fundamental inherent liberty which has been protected in other statutes, such as the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1993, which protects the freedom of religion by 
prohibiting discrimination based on religious belief in relation to, for example, 
employment. 
See s 13 of the NZBORA. 
9 
The right to act in accordance with one's religion is often postulated as a 
basic human right. Statutory recognition of this right can be found in 
section 15 of the NZBORA.29 Section 15 of the NZBORA substantially tracks 
the wording of article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("the ICCPR").30 New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR 
is affirmed in part (b) of the Long Title to the NZBORA. Accordingly, the 
interpretation of the ICCPR is a useful extrinsic aid to the interpretation of 
section 15 of our Act.31 Further, the legal presumption that Parliament does 
not intend to breach its obligations under international law also dictates that 
the ICCPR should be complied with, wherever this is possible.32 
The constitutional right to manifest one's religion is a requirement that the 
state should be neutral about the outcomes pertaining to a person's 
individual choice of religion. However, religious liberty has never been 
considered to be an absolute value. For example, in the United States, laws 
which ban religious snake handling rituals are not considered to be 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Section 15 of the NZBORA "Every person has the right to manifest that person's 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching, either individually or 
in community with others, and either in public or in private". In addition to s 15, s 20 
provides that: "A person who belongs to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in 
New Zealand shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of that 
minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practice the religion, or to use the 
language of that minority." This is not a right to practice religion, but the right of 
minorities not to be denied the ability to do so. 
Article 18 (1) of the ICCPR is set out as follows: "Every one has the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief; and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance". Section 20 of the NZBORA also has an equivalent article in the ICCPR. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR provides that "In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their language". 
The ICCPR is enforced through the mechanism of a reporting system, whereby each 
member country is periodically required to furnish a statement reporting on the 
implementation of the ICCPR by the government of that country. These reports are 
scrutinised by the Human Rights Committee. States may also bring complaints about 
other member states to the attention of the Human Rights Committee. In addition to 
this, the interpretation of the articles in the ICCPR are elucidated upon in the 
"General Comments" on particular provisions which are published from time to time 
by the Human Rights Committee. 
However, the Human Rights Committee have not made a General Comment about the 
application of art 18(1) or art 27, and cases brought to the attention of the Human 
Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol do not provide guidance as to the scope 
of the article's protection in relation to when a treatment refusal on religious grounds 
should be upheld. An analysis of virtually identical provisions in the European 
Covenant on Human Rights is similarly unhelpful. 
10 
unconstitutional violations of the right to manifest one's religion.33 
Moreover, in Reynolds v United States,34 the Supreme Court asked itself 
the following rhetorical question: 
[I]f a wife religiously believed it was her duty to bum herself upon the funeral pile of 
her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent 
her carrying her belief into practice? 
The neat point in relation to this paper, is the issue of whether refusals of 
medical treatment based on religious grounds may be overridden in a like 
manner. Can any analogy be drawn between the Reynolds situation and the 
religiously motivated treatment refusal that will probably lead to a patient's 
death? 
C The Right to Refu.se Medical Treatment 
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body ... 35 
The principles of bodily integrity and self determination are well established 
at common law, evidence of which can be seen in the classic statement of 
Justice Cardozo quoted above.36 These principles are said to enable a patient 
to refuse medical treatment. The general proposition that medical treatment 
may be declined by a patient is recognised in section 11 of the NZBORA, 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See Lawson v Commonwealth (1942) 164 SW 2d 972, 974. 
(1878) 98 US 145, 166. But, see Morrison v State (1952) 252 SW 2d 97, 103: "[A] religious 
zealot may have the right to fast until death". 
Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92, 93 per 
Cardozo J. In this case it was decided that operating to remove a tumour after a 
patient had specifically forbidden surgery was an 'assault'. 
See also Natanson v Kline (1960) 350 2d 1093, 1094 and Sidaway v Beth/em Royal 
Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643, 666. In the New Zealand case of Smith v 
Auckland Area Health Board [1965] NZLR 191, 219, T A Gresson J stated in dictum 
that: "An individual patient must. .. always retain the right to decline operative 
investigation or treatment however unreasonable or foolish this may appear in the 
eyes of his medical advisers" . 
11 
which provides that: "Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo medical 
treatment".37 
The right of the individual to choose what should be done with one's body 
is embodied in the doctrine of informed consent. The law relating to 
informed consent in New Zealand is complex and difficult.38 Basically, 
informed consent requires that patients are allowed to make their own 
decisions about whether or not to undergo medical treatment. 
A patient's consent is not always required before medical treatment can 
proceed. There are two principle exceptions to the requirement that consent 
be obtained before any medical treatment can be performed. These are, first, 
where there is a statutory exception to consent;39 and secondly, where an 
emergency situation arises. In the latter case, medical treatment may be 
justified on three possible grounds: the common law principle of 
necessity,40 implied consent41 or agency.42 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Section 11 of the NZBORA has no equivalent in any human rights instrument. It has 
been suggested that this provision only permits individuals to be treated against 
their will where this is necessary to protect the health and safety of others: A Bill 
of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper [1985] AJHR A6, 109. The White Paper 
also suggests that "medical treatment" should be interpreted in a comprehensive 
sense. It is likely that the courts will interpret this phrase widely. The courts have 
shown that they will give a purposive reading to the NZBORA: See Flickinger v 
Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439 and R v Accused 227/91 (1991) 7 CRNZ 
401. A purposive reading is consistent with Temm J's suggestion in Cairns v James 
[1992] NZFLR 353, 355, that a blood test might amount to medical treatment and the 
decision in Re H [1993] NZFLR 225, 241, where Judge Inglis QC held that the 
sterilisation of a mentally handicapped woman was medical treatment, despite the 
fact that neither a blood test nor a sterilisation operation could be classed as 
therapeutic or curative treatment. Compare D B Collins Medical Law in New 
Zealand (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 1992) 117, who has suggested that, on one 
reading, diagnostic or preventative 'treatment' may not be medical treatment. 
For this reason, this paper does not purport to be an exhaustive exposition of this area 
of law. Instead, this section will outline the basic requirements of informed consent as 
they are relevant to this paper. 
For example, section 126B of the Health Act 1956. This provision is considered below, 
text to n 132. 
See Marshall v Curry (1933) 3 DLR (4th) 260 and F v West Berkshire Health 
Authority [1989] 2 All ER 545. The application of this doctrine is uncertain in New 
Zealand. See Collins, above n 37, 69. 
Consent may be implied from the surrounding circumstances or from a patient's prior 
comments. Implied consent could never adequately explain a failure to honour a 
treatment refusal on religious grounds, as there the circumstances or comments made 
by the patient would never warrant such a finding. 
There is limited authority which suggests that consent to medical treatment is not 
required if the doctor is acting as the agent of a patient. This is not a widely 
recognised concept. See Bennan v Parsonett (1912) 83 NJ Law; cf Marshall v Curry, 
aboven 40. 
12 
Where informed consent is required, this will usually involve the patient's 
doctor explaining the nature of the proposed treatment and the known risks 
that are inherent in the procedure:43 
Medical consent means a voluntary uncoerced decision made by a legally competent or 
autonomous person on the basis of adequate information and discussion. This contrasts 
with the rejection of a proposed course of action, in short, it is a choice. 
Informed consent implies that there must be a respectful and broadly 
rational dialogue between doctor and patient.44 Treatment decisions must be 
consensual, rather than imposed on a patient. The patient's role is 
participatory, not passive. Thus, doctors should not let their own values 
influence a patient's treatment decision to the extent that effective 
deliberation is conflated with reaching a decision acceptable to the doctor. 
The requirement that there be informed consent to medical decisions does 
not simply require an analysis of whether sufficient45 information has been 
disclosed by the doctor to the patient. In order for consent to be judged as 
'informed', patients must be competent to comprehend the information 
provided to them, must also understand that information and then must 
arrive at a voluntary decision. 46 
The prerequisite of competence 1s a legal presumption. Precisely how 
competency is analysed is uncertain, but there are no grounds for assuming 
that a patient is incompetent just because their decision to refuse treatment 
seems irrational. Competency must be assessed independently of the 
decision reached by a patient and the reasons for that decision. However, if a 
patient does not have the capacity to render a decision, then informed 
consent cannot be given.47 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
See Medical Council of New Zealand Statement for the Medical Profession on 
Information and Consent (June 1990) 20. See also Collins, above n 37, 65. 
See A Campbell, G Gillett & G Jones Practical Medical Ethics (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1992) 21-23. 
There is no legal definition of "sufficient" information. 
V Dharmananda Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: Processes, Practices and 
Beliefs (Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, 1992) 9. 
However, a finding that a religious patient is incompetent must not follow from a 
perception that the decision that patient renders is silly or illogical. See below, text 
ton 62. 
13 
If a patient is competent, it is assumed that when provided with 
information, it will be understood. But if patients do not understand the 
information they are given, then consent cannot be considered to be 
informed. If the requisites of information, competency and understanding 
have been satisfied, then a patient's decision to consent or refuse to submit 
to medical treatment can be called informed, unless the patient has been 
coerced or pressured into arriving at a particular decision.48 
A question which arises out of this analysis of informed consent is how 
informed must a patient who wishes to refuse consent to medical treatment 
be in order for that decision to be upheld? In practice, the medical profession 
follows the same procedures for all patients. If a patient is able to make a 
treatment decision, then this will be explored as fully as possible with that 
patient. In ordinary circumstances, this will involve an explanation of the 
procedures involved and of the consequences of the proposed treatment in 
order that the patient is made fully aware of the likely outcomes. This 
reflects the fact that consenting and refusing are flipsides of the same 
medical decision. The best answer to this question appears to require the 
application of the same standard to both consents and refusals. 
But the position becomes complicated when a patient is not competent to 
make treatment decisions, by reason of incapacity. In these situations, it has 
been noted that informed consent is not always required. Similarly, 
informed refusal need not always be required before a patient should be able 
to refuse medical treatment. For example, where a patient has made a prior 
directive in unequivocal language,49 the requirement that that patient must 
be informed about the consequences of this refusal is redundant. If this 
requirement were insisted upon, it would provide an unnecessary barrier to 
patient autonomy.so 
A medical practitioner who fails to honour a patient's decision to refuse 
medical treatment by undertaking an examination against a person's will, 
and a surgeon who performs an operation or part of an operation, in spite of 
the refusal, may each have actions brought against them in court and be 
subject to medical disciplinary proceedings. 
48 
49 
50 
See below, text ton 63. 
As in Malette, above n 24. 
See below, text to n 68. 
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A civil suit for assault and battery may be commenced against a doctor who 
fails to respect a treatment refusal. The significance of these remedies is 
diminished in New Zealand by virtue of the application of the Accident 
Rehabilitation Compensation and Insurance Act 1992 ("the ARCI Act"). The 
commencement of any action for compensatory damages is precluded 
where cover is provided in the Act.51 Nevertheless, there is some scope for 
obtaining a remedy outside the ARCI Act, as a failure by a doctor to obtain a 
patient's informed consent to treatment will only be medical misadventure, 
if that failure is caused by negligence.52 But where the statutory bar applies, 
the courts will only entertain a claim for exemplary damages for assault or 
battery and possibly also for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty.53 
It is possible that criminal proceedings may be commenced for assault54 or 
unlawfully injuring a person,55 but it is noted by Collins that criminal 
actions are unlikely to be commenced unless a member of the profession 
abuses his or her position to such an extent that it becomes necessary to 
invoke the criminal law.s6 
Disciplinary proceedings may be invoked against a doctor who fails to 
honour a treatment refusal. Medical disciplinary proceedings in New 
Zealand are largely self-regulated by the medical profession. Section 40 of 
the Medical Practitioners Act 1968 establishes a Medical Practitioners 
Disciplinary Committee to investigate complaints of medical misconduct 
that are directed against medical practitioners.57 This disciplinary 
Committee is charged with protecting the public through the identification 
of deficient practitioners. 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Sees 14 of the ARCI Act. 
Sees 5(6) of the ARCI Act. 
Collins, above n 37, 179-182. 
Section 196, Crimes Act 1961. 
Section 190, Crimes Act 1961. 
Collins, above n 37, 67. 
There are three different categories of medical misconduct. These are, in ascending 
order of seriousness, "conduct unbecoming of a medical practitioner", "professional 
misconduct" and "disgraceful conduct". Professional misconduct is determined 
objectively, by referring to the practice of a doctor's peers: See Ongley v Medical 
Council of New Zealand (1984) 4 NZAR 369, 375. 
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ID THE ADULT RELIGIOUS PATIENT 
The preceding chapter outlined the prima fade rights that religious patients 
have to manifest their beliefs and to refuse medical treatment. This chapter 
considers the scope of these rights as they have been defined by the courts 
and the legislature. It discusses the exercise of a competent patient's rights 
and the exercise of an 'incompetent' patient's rights. The question of 
whether and to what extent incapacitated patients can refuse treatment or 
have someone else take action for them often arises in the context of an 
emergency, where the capacity of patients to make treatment decisions is 
temporarily lost or reduced. Both the emergency and the non emergency 
situations are discussed below. 
A The Competent Patient 
While the New Zealand courts have not had the opportunity to comment 
on the right of an adult patient to refuse consent to medical treatment on 
religious grounds, the English Court of Appeal recently had occasion to do 
just that in the case of Re T.58 
The slightly unusual facts of Re T are as follows. Miss T was admitted to 
hospital after being injured in a car accident when she was 34 weeks 
pregnant. The possibility that she might require a blood transfusion arose, 
and after discussing this with her mother, she indicated that she would not 
consent to this procedure. She said that this was because she used to be a 
Jehovah's Witness and still maintained some of their beliefs. There was 
some suggestion that this refusal may have been the result of undue 
influence by her mother, a staunch Jehovah's Witness.59 
58 
59 
[1992] 4 All ER 649. 
Above n 58, 655 per Lord Donaldson MR: "For some time before 5 pm her mother was 
alone with Miss T. What passed between them I do not know because Miss T has never 
been able to say and the mother, although a party to the proceedings, has not seen fit 
to give evidence. At 5 pm a staff nurse joined Miss T and her mother and Miss T told 
the staff nurse that she did not want a blood transfusion ... The staff nurse said she 
had thought it strange that this statement should have been volunteered out of the 
blue moments after her mother had arrived. However, she thought that at that stage 
Miss T was able to understand what was going on" . 
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Due to her distressed condition, T went into early labour and it was decided 
that her delivery should be by caesarean section. T blindly signed a form 
refusing consent to medical treatment. It was not explained to her that a 
blood transfusion might be necessary to save her life. After the caesarean 
operation, her condition worsened to the extent that a blood transfusion 
would "unhesitatingly" have been administered but for T's express refusal. 
T's father and boyfriend applied to the court for assistance. The judge in an 
emergency hearing authorised the administration of the blood transfusion 
and declared that it would not be unlawful for the hospital to transfuse T 
despite absence of consent, because the transfusion was manifestly in her 
best interests. At a second hearing the judge held that T had neither 
consented nor refused medical treatment in the emergency which had 
arisen. Thus, the administration of the blood transfusion was not unlawful. 
T appealed from this decision and the appeal was dismissed. 
The Court of Appeal held that the principle of bodily integrity prima fade 
gives a patient the right to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds, 
even where this may lead to premature death or permanent damage to 
one's health.60 Butler-Sloss L J cited with approval the reasoning of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Malette v Shulman,61 where Robins J A said: 
At issue here is the freedom of the patient as an individual to exercise her right to 
refuse treatment and accept the consequences of her own decision. Competent adults, 
as I have sought to demonstrate, are generally at liberty to refuse medical treatment 
even at the risk of death. The right to determine what shall be done with one's own 
body is a fundamental right in our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the 
bedrock upon which the principles of self-determination and individual autonomy 
are based. Free individual choice in matters affecting this right should in my 
opinion, be accorded very high priority. 
However, in the opinion of the court, this right can only be exercised when 
a patient has the capacity to make such a decision. Aside from those who 
permanently lack capacity to make decisions, a lack of capacity may result 
from a patient's decision being overborne by another or from temporary 
circumstances such as unconsciousness, shock, confusion or delusion.62 
60 
61 
62 
See Sidaway, above n 36, 666. 
Aboven24. 
See A Pavlo, H Burstajn & T Gutheil "Christian Science and Competence to Make 
Treatment Choices: Clinical Challenges in Assessing Values" (1987) 10 International 
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From both the legal and clinical perspective, deciding whether a patient is 
competent to refuse medical treatment is a difficult determination. Lord 
Donaldson stated that careful and detailed consideration had to be given to 
the question of capacity and articulated the following test which he thought 
should be applied:63 
What matters is that the doctor should consider whether at that time he had a 
capacity which was commensurate with the gravity of the decision which he 
purported to make. The more serious the decision, the greater the capacity required. 
Thus, if a patient's decision making capacity is thought to be reduced 
because of the effects of severe fatigue or shock, then that patient's decision 
to refuse lifesaving medical treatment need not be honoured in a life 
threatening situation. However, this analysis of capacity is problematic. If a 
patient cannot fully comprehend the nature and consequences of refusing 
treatment where this might cause death or severe damage to health, should 
it be assumed that the patient is still sufficiently lucid to refuse treatment 
where the consequences are not so dire? This could result in confusing the 
patient's ability to make a decision with the consequences that follow from 
it. 
If it is decided that a patient is competent to make a treatment decision, it 
must then be decided whether the treatment decision that the patient 
arrives at is voluntary. The decision of a patient may be set aside if it has 
been unduly influenced. Where the decision of a patient is said to be 
vitiated by undue influence, the question which Lord Donaldson said must 
be addressed by the courts is:64 
63 
64 
Does the patient really mean what he says or is he merely saying it for a quiet life, 
to satisfy someone else or because the advice and persuasion to which he has been 
subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide for himself? In other words, is 
it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality? 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 395. If a patient's choice of religion occurs while 
deluded, then that patient's choice to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds 
might not be competent. 
Above n 58, 661. 
Above n 58, 661. 
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As to the question of whether undue influence had vitiated the consent of 
Miss T, Lord Donaldson found that the mother had so sapped T's will that it 
had destroyed her volition. His Lordship noted that the degree of 
persuasion required to turn persuasion and appeals to affection into undue 
influence may be very little. As Hannen P said in Wingrove v Wingrove,65 
a case which was cited with approval by Butler-Sloss L J: 
The coercion may of course be of different kinds, it may be in the grossest form, such as 
actual confinement or violence, or a person in the last two days or hours of life may 
have become so weak and feeble that a very little pressure will be sufficient to bring 
about the desired result, and it may even be that the mere talking to him at that 
stage of illness and pressing something upon him may so fatigue the brain, that the 
sick person may be induced, for quietness' sake, to do anything. This would equally be 
coercion, though not actual violence. 
An analysis of the decision in Re T shows that the courts and the medical 
profession can restrict the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment on 
religious grounds in two ways. A challenge may be made to either a 
patient's competence or the voluntariness of the decision made. It is hoped 
that these methods of disposing with a religious patient's rights is resorted 
to in appropriate cases, rather than as ex post facto justifications for 
overriding what could be classed as an irrational decision by doctors or the 
courts.66 
B The 'Incompetent' Patient 
When patients become incapable of making their own decisions about 
whether or not to consent to medical treatment, they should not lose their 
common law and constitutional rights simply because of their state of 
incompetence. Traditionally, the patient's family or doctor is turned to to 
render this decision for an incompetent patient. But turning to these people 
involves a danger that the patient's own wishes will be ignored. In the 
United States, Canada and Australia, legislation has been passed to allow 
65 
66 
(1886) 11 PD 81, 82-83. 
In Re W [1992] 4 All ER 627, 637, Lord Donaldson admitted that he personally 
considers religious beliefs which bar any medical treatment or treatment of 
particular kinds to be "irrational". 
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competent persons to make advance directives concerning medical 
treatment.67 These advance directives are intended to influence care should 
the maker of the directive become incompetent. Advance directives may be 
of two types: the instruction directive or the proxy directive. 
This section of the paper considers the effect of incapacity on a patient's 
rights. It discusses the power of patients to refuse medical treatment on 
religious grounds after they become incapacitated and the power of 
surrogates to refuse treatment on behalf of a religious patient. 
1 The instruction directive 
It has been shown in the preceding part of this paper that competent 
patients are generally able to exercise their rights to medical self-
determination and to manifest their religious beliefs. The danger that these 
rights may be overridden in the event of incompetence may be guarded 
against if a patient has made an instruction directive. This instruction 
directive would dictate the course of medical treatment to be followed when 
a patient cannot expressly make this known to doctors. The ability of a 
patient to follow this course of action at common law was recognised in 
Malette v Shulman. 68 The Malette case considered the right of an 
unconscious Jehovah's Witness to refuse medical treatment by carrying a 
card which purported to refuse of all blood transfusions. Mrs Malette 
suffered serious injuries in a car accident. After she was taken to hospital, 
she was attended by Dr Shulman, whose initial examination showed that 
treatment might require blood transfusions. After this examination, a nurse 
found a card, signed by Mrs Malette, which read: 
67 
68 
These are known as 'Natural Death' or 'Living Will' statutes. 35 states in the United 
States have enacted provisions for patients to make prior binding instructions 
regarding medical procedures to be omitted where the patient is extremely 
debilitated. These statutes have more symbolic than actual value for two reasons. 
First, these laws usually require that a patient have a prognosis of imminent death 
before life preserving medical treatment may be refused and secondly, people are not 
normally oriented toward providing for advance directives, which limits the 
usefulness of a law that provides for their validity. The requirement that a patient 
must be terminal before an instruction directive refusing life preserving medical 
treatment will be honoured is open to criticism. It is submitted that a young, generally 
healthy person should have the same right to refuse treatment as an elderly 
terminal patient. 
Aboven 24. 
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NO BLOOD TRANSFUSION! 
As one of Jehovah's Witnesses with firm religious convictions, I request that no blood 
or blood products be administered to me under any circumstances. I fully realise the 
implications of this position but I have resolutely decided to obey the Bible 
command: "Keep abstaining ... from blood." (Acts 15:28, 29). However, I have no 
objection to use the non-blood alternatives, such as Dextran, Haemaccel, PVP, 
Ringer's Lactate or saline solution. 
The doctor was advised of the existence and contents of the card, but 
administered blood transfusions to Mrs Malette in spite of this knowledge. 
Mrs Malette made a full recovery and then sued Dr Shulman for battery. 
She was awarded $20,000 in damages by the Ontario High Court of Justice. 
Dr Shulman appealed this judgment and Mrs Malette cross-appealed for the 
costs of the action. 
In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Robins J A upheld the decision of the lower 
court. The decision was premised upon the patient's first instance right to 
self determination which he said "obviously encompasses the right to 
refuse medical treatment".69 This was not postulated to be an absolute right; 
it was noted by Robins J A that it could give way in an emergency 
situation.70 Mrs Malette's predicament could be classified as an emergency 
situation. However, Mrs Malette had anticipated this kind of situation and 
had given express instructions that in this event, she should not be given a 
blood transfusion. Because of the card which she carried, a valid restriction 
was imposed upon the doctor's ability to treat Mrs Malette's injuries, despite 
the emergency circumstances. 
The treatment refusal made by Mrs Malette was upheld by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal because it was said to be an unequivocal refusal of all blood 
transfusions. Robins J A rejected the contention that a refusal should always 
69 
70 
Above n 24, 328. Also on that page his honour commented that: "The doctrine of 
informed consent is plainly intended to ensure the freedom of individuals to make 
choices concerning their medical care. For this freedom to be meaningful, people must 
have the right to make choices that accord with their own values regardless of how 
unwise or foolish those choices may appear to others". 
Two bases were articulated for the dispensing of the consent requirement in such a 
situation. These are 'implied consent' and the principle of necessity. The latter of 
these bases was recognised as the more usual justification. Robins J A indicated 
disapproval of reliance upon 'implied consent' as a basis for justifying a lack of 
consent. 
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be informed before it can be effective. His honour said that a doctor has no 
duty to advise a patient of the risks associated with a refusal of treatment. 
He reasoned that if this were the case, "Mrs Malette's religiously motivated 
instructions prepared in contemplation of an emergency, directing that she 
not be given blood transfusions in any circumstances were of no force or 
effect and could be ignored with impunity".71 
This does not mean that directions made by a patient prior to becoming 
incapacitated will always be honoured. In Re T,72 Lord Donaldson opined 
that the scope and basis of a treatment refusal should be considered before a 
refusal can be honoured.73 The articulation of this scope and basis 
requirement may have been motivated his Lordship's concerns about the 
proximity and specificity of instruction directives. These directives cannot 
usually provide guidance in every possible situation and they do not 
typically take into account how a person's values may change with time. 
Where a patient is competent, the scope and basis requirement simply 
requires asking that patient if treatment is still to be rejected.74 But where a 
once competent patient refuses treatment before becoming incapacitated, it 
must be considered whether the patient's decision is intended to operate in 
the changed circumstances. Lord Donaldson set out a general requirement 
that the patient must know "the nature and effect of the procedure for 
which consent (or refusal) was given".75 This requirement appears to create 
a duty to give patients appropriately full information as to: 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
(i) the nature of the treatment which is proposed; and 
(ii) the likely risks, including any special risks attaching to the 
treatment being administered by particular persons. 
Above n 24,331. 
Aboven 61. 
Above n 61, 662. 
Above n 61, 662. Lord Donaldson said that a doctor could still attempt to get the 
patient to consent to treatment at this stage, notwithstanding the prior refusal. 
Above n 61, 663. 
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If a doctor fails to adequately inform a patient, this does not necessarily 
vitiate consent or refusal, but may entitle a patient to bring an action in 
negligence based on a breach of duty.76 
In the Malette case, a written instruction directive was made representing 
Mrs Malette's desire not to be transfused. Had this directive been made 
orally, there would have been a further hurdle to jump before Mrs Malette's 
wishes could be honoured. The degree of informality of an oral expression 
has to be considered before it can be said that an oral instruction is intended 
to take effect. In cases of doubt, it seems understandable that the profession 
and the courts should err on the side of life and good medical practice. Thus, 
the evidence required to prove the earnestness of an oral expression must 
be more than the ordinary civil standard. It is suggested that something 
between this and the balance of probabilities test required in a criminal 
action would be appropriate, so as not to rule out the possibility of 
honouring an oral directive where the circumstances warrant this. The 
United States requirement of "clear and convincing" evidence merits 
serious consideration in this context.77 
Although it is clear that a written instruction directive is more likely to be 
honoured than an oral expression of a patient's wishes, it is difficult to 
reconcile the scope and basis requirement in Re T with Malette v Shulman. 
The court in Re T clearly intended to articulate a requirement that doctors 
ascertain the scope and basis of a treatment refusal in Re T. It was suggested 
that, wherever possible, a patient must know the nature and effect of the 
refusal of treatment. Therefore, Malette v Shulman must categorised as an 
exception to the information requirement in Re T. Because the Malette case 
involved an unconditional refusal of treatment it is presumed that the 
court in Re T did not think that any consideration of scope was necessary. 
However, if, as was suggested by the court in Re T, a doctor can intervene 
and treat a patient when she has reason to believe that a prior refusal was 
76 
77 
Although his honour noted that misinformation might vitiate consent or refusal. See 
above n 61, 663. 
In the case of In Re Storar (1981) 420 NE 2d 64, 68, clear and convincing evidence of 
oral instructions was required . This requirement was satisfied by evidence which 
showed that formal discussions about a terminal patient's right to die. This can be 
contrasted with the informality of Karen Quinlan's casual remarks on the same 
subject, which she made at a social gathering. See In Re Quinlan (1976) 355 A 2d 647. 
See also below, text ton 94. 
23 
not fixed and unalterable,78 this challenges the court's acceptance of Mrs 
Malette's refusal as unequivocal. Indeed it is open to question whether any 
prior decision of a patient will ever be fixed and unalterable. In addition to 
this, as is often the case with legal tests, it is a lack of clarity at the periphery 
of its application which causes the scope and basis requirement its greatest 
problems. 
While upholding the Malette decision may limit doctors from 
administering medical treatment wherever a patient makes an instruction 
directive to the effect that 'all' medical treatment should be refused, it is 
still possible to suggest that other refusals may be intended to have a more 
limited scope.79 In all but the most clear cases then, a doctor could treat a 
patient if satisfied that the patient's predicament was not anticipated when 
treatment was initially refused.80 This may be an unintended result of Re T. 
It is suggested that patients who genuinely wish to make instruction 
directives that reflect their religious beliefs relating to medical treatment 
should be careful to phrase any treatment refusals in clear and 
unconditional language. This will help to ensure that the directive 
withstands the scrutiny of an analysis of its scope and basis . If an 
unconditional refusal of medical treatment is not desired, then it would be 
beneficial for a patient to set out preferred treatment options which would 
operate in several different scenarios of incapacity. 
2 The surrogate decision 
Under current law, it is not always clear who has authority to step in and 
make treatment choices for an incapacitated patient. Traditionally, where a 
patient has not made a proxy directive appointing a surrogate, a patient's 
family or doctor will approve or disapprove a course of treatment when the 
patient can no longer do this. But this assignment of decision making power 
creates the risk that the patient's own wishes will be ignored. This section 
78 
79 
80 
See C Bridge "Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds" [1992] NZLJ 341, 
343. 
For example, it may have been limited to situations where there were other 
alternatives, or where the refusal was not likely to be life threatening. 
Aboven 78. 
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considers the appointment of a surrogate and the surrogate decision making 
process. 
(a) Appointment 
In New Zealand law, there is some scope for a patient to appoint a proxy 
decision maker who may make decisions concerning that patient's care and 
welfare in the event of mental incapacity. Although at common law, a 
proxy directive is unlikely to be upheld,81 statutory provision is made for 
the creation of enduring power of attorney under the Protection of Personal 
and Property Rights Act 1988 ("the PPPRA"). Sections 95 and 98 of that Act 
set out the mechanisms by which a proxy may be appointed.82 
The power of a proxy decision maker to refuse medical treatment on behalf 
of an incapacitated person is circumscribed by section 18(1)(c) of the PPPRA. 
According to that provision, the proxy decision maker is not empowered to 
refuse consent to any standard medical treatment or procedure intended to 
save the incapacitated person's life or to prevent serious damage to that 
person's health. Accordingly, if the patient's prognosis is death without 
some standard medical treatment,83 then the proxy has no power to refuse 
this treatment, even though that decision might represent the wishes of the 
patient. Where the patient's prognosis is not quite so grim, the proxy may be 
able to refuse treatment. 
The limitation on the proxy's ability to make decisions in the PPPRA may 
reflect a concern for the proxy decision maker. The burden or a life and 
death decision is an enormous responsibility. In addition to this, the proxy 
may not have discussed a range of care preferences with the patient or may 
81 
82 
83 
At common law, the appointment of a proxy is regulated through the laws of agency. 
According to the rules of agency, when the principal becomes incapacitated, the 
contract of agency is terminated and the agent no longer has any mandate to act on the 
principal's behalf. But see M Fowler "Appointing A Medical Agent to Make 
Treatment Decisions" (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 985, 1012. 
Section 95 of the PPPRA sets out the prerequisites that must be complied with if a 
power of attorney is to be an enduring power of attorney. Section 98 provides that a 
person may create an enduring power of attorney in relation to personal care and 
welfare which will operate in the event of the donor's incapacity 
It is submitted that the courts would treat a blood transfusion as "standard medical 
treatment" . 
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disagree with the patient's wishes. The law may reflect a concern that, in 
these situations, there is scope for the proxy to undermine the patient's 
wishes. 
However, the state of the law relating to proxy decision making under the 
PPPRA is unsatisfactory. It is submitted that a proxy should be able to make 
all the treatment decisions that the patient, if competent, could have. 
Concern about the burden on the proxy should not be overstated. Simply 
because a decision is difficult does not mean a proxy should be denied the 
ability to make it. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to curtail the powers of 
a proxy because of a concern that a biased decision might be made. This 
concern will be addressed in the next parts of this paper. If the surrogate 
must base a treatment decision on the patient's wishes, and consultation is 
ordinarily required before this decision is implemented, then the possibility 
of bias is reduced. 
If a patient has not given any prior instructions relating to treatment 
preferences or the appointment of a proxy, then the family of that patient 
will typically be consulted and asked to perform the function of a surrogate. 
The legal basis of this deference to the family is unclear, although the 
practice appears to have been sanctioned by silent acquiescence on the part 
of the courts and the legislature.84 While there is no explicit endorsement of 
the process of looking to a patient's next of kin to provide surrogate 
decisions, it is presumed that the patient's family will have the patient's 
welfare at heart and will be best placed to know her wishes. 
Usually turning to family members means that there will be discussion and 
consensus between the patient's family and a decision will be made in the 
patient's best interests or according to the patient's wishes. This will not 
always be the case. Moreover, next of kin may not be motivated by concern 
for the patient or may be too distraught to render a treatment decision for an 
incapacitated patient. Screening next of kin for suitability in court would be 
both an expensive and time consuming process and it is submitted that it 
84 The practice may amount to nothing more than medical courtesy. If this is the case, 
then a large percentage of operations are performed without technically valid 
consent. See above n 81, 994. 
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would be excessive to require prior approval of family members as 
surrogates.SS 
In addition to this,86 a decision to appoint a surrogate may be made by the 
courts using one of three methods. First, the court may make an order 
appointing a welfare guardian under section 12 of the PPPRA. A welfare 
guardian is empowered to act as an incapacitated patient's surrogate. But the 
powers of the welfare guardian under the PPPRA is also subject to the 
operation of section 18(1)(c). For this reason, the powers of a welfare 
guardian as derived under the PPPRA are, like the powers of a proxy 
appointed under this Act, closely circumscribed. 
In addition to the court's power to appoint a welfare guardian under this 
Act, it may also make an order in relation to medical treatment under 
section lO(f) or lO(g). Those provisions allow the court to make the 
following orders: 
(f) An order that the person be provided with medical advice or treatment of a 
kind specified in the order: 
(g) An order that the person be provided with educational, rehabilitative, 
therapeutic or other services of a kind specified in the order: 
These provisions appear to dictate that such orders can only be made in 
respect of providing medical treatment. However, in the absence of judicial 
enlightenment regarding the interpretation of these provisions, it may be 
possible for the court to read them widely so as to enable orders to be made 
which refuse, rather than provide, medical treatment. If this is the case, 
then the application of the PPPRA dictates that two primary objectives must 
govern the decision of a court to grant an order under section 8 of the Act. 
Section 8(a) provides that the court must make the least restrictive 
intervention possible in the life of the patient. In addition to section 8(a), 
section 8(b) must also govern the court's decision. Section 8(b) provides that 
a decision must enable or encourage the patient to exercise and develop 
capacity to the greatest possible extent. These provisions appear to dictate 
85 
86 
Above n 81, 995. This may prolong the suffering of the patient and aggravate the 
distress of the family. 
Or when disagreement occurs among family members. 
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that decisions made by the courts under the PPPRA should be patient 
oriented. 
The final method by which the court may appoint a surrogate decision 
maker is in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as parens patriae to give 
or withhold consent to medical treatment.87 In the exercise of this 
jurisdiction, the court has the power to refuse medical treatment on behalf 
of the patient, even where this would be life threatening. 
Where a patient has not appointed a medical agent, it is submitted that the 
appointment of a surrogate should be governed by the operation of 
professional standards. The use of the courts to screen surrogates for 
suitability and bona fides would be cumbersome and inefficient, particularly 
where time is of the essence. In this situation, professional guidelines 
should dictate that a patient's family ought to be used as a surrogate in most 
cases,88 unless the patient's doctor believes that family circumstances dictate 
that this is not the best course of action. For example, difficulty may occur 
where the family of the religious patient does not share that patient's 
convictions. In that situation, it may be appropriate that a surrogate who 
understands the religious patient's treatment convictions and is willing to 
effect the patient's wishes ought to be appointed. 
Where considerations of time are not as pressing, a decision not to appoint a 
family member as a surrogate should be subject to the approval of an ethics 
committee. Ethics committees may be better qualified to make 
recommendations about the suitability of a surrogate in the event of 
difficulty than the courts if these bodies are representative and accessible. 
Further, the more informal nature of ethics committee hearings may be a 
more appropriate way of dealing with any problems involving the 
appointment of a surrogate. A court hearing will often be an insensitive 
way of dealing with the family of an incapacitated person. 
87 
88 
Sees 17 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
In the absence of evidence of a patient's wishes, it is reasonable to infer that the 
patient's relatives will have a better idea of what the patient would consider to be 
benefits or burdens than a medical practitioner, whose ideas about the patient's best 
interests may be dominated by a desire to treat the patient. 1his is particularly so in 
the case of a Maori or Pacific Island family, where important decisions are commonly 
discussed within the family as opposed to made in isolation from this support. 
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It will not always be possible to seek approval from an ethics committee for 
every surrogate's appointment. Wherever this is practicable, it is desirable 
that approval for a decision not to appoint a family member as a surrogate 
be obtained. Where it appears that there is no one available to act as a 
patient's surrogate, it is submitted that an ethics committee should be able 
to make a determination relating to the treatment of that patient. 
(b) The basis of the surrogate's decision 
Once a surrogate has been appointed for a particular patient, it must then be 
asked whether the surrogate lawfully exercised the decision making power 
which is granted to the surrogate by virtue of this appointment.89 United 
States jurisprudence may be instructive in relation to an analysis of the 
lawfulness of a surrogate's decision to refuse treatment. There are two main 
schools of thought regarding the manner in which a surrogate's decision 
should be exercised. The first is the 'substituted judgment' approach90 and 
the second is the 'best interests' approach.91 
The substituted judgment approach aims to mirror the patient's decision. 
Where it is clear that the patient would have refused medical treatment if 
he were competent to make this choice, then the decision of the surrogate 
should accord with these wishes.92 Clear and convincing evidence of the 
patient's wishes may be required before a substituted judgment may be 
made.93 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act does not apply to the exercise of a surrogate's 
discretion: See s 3 which provides that only state action is caught by the operation of 
the Act. 
See In re Conroy (1985) 486 A 2d 1209 and In re Quinlan above n 78. 
See In re F [1990] 2 AC 1 and Airedale NHS Trust Board v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316, 
370, 385, and 398. See also s 18(3) of the PPPRA. 
The substituted judgment approach has been curiously described as including an 
implicit "thank you test", whereby a patient, when again competent would agree 
with the decision of the surrogate and thank that person for making it: See A A Stone 
"The right to refuse treatment and the Psychiatric Establishment" (1974) 4 
Psychiatric Annals 22. 
See Cruzan v Director of Missouri Department of Health (1990) 110 S Ct 2841, In re 
Storar, above n 78; and Eichner v Dillon (1981) 420 NE 2d 64; cf In re Quinlan, above n 
77, where evidence other than the patient's wishes was considered. 
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Substituted judgment can be exercised only upon the basis that the decision 
reached by the surrogate is fully informed. The surrogate has to reach a 
decision that can truly be said to represent what the patient would have 
chosen. The evidence required to prove that a decision is informed will 
vary according to the facts of each case. In Eichner v Dillon,9 4 it was 
suggested that clear and convincing proof of a patient's wishes could be 
established by pointing to the tenets of the religion to which the patient 
belongs. Or alternatively, an advance directive made either orally or in 
writing. This general statement must be subject to limitations. For example, 
pointing to the tenets of a particular religion to which a patient belongs will 
be insufficient without evidence of how these tenets have been internalised 
by the patient. The clear and convincing evidence standard is a more 
stringent standard of proof than the balance of probabilities test ordinarily 
required by the court. The advantage of using this higher standard of proof 
is that it balances the patient's probable wishes against the danger of 
upholding a treatment refusal which was not made after careful 
consideration or may not represent the patient's wishes anymore. 
Doubt about the application of the substituted judgment approach in the life 
or death situation has been voiced by commentators.95 It has been argued 
that when a treatment refusal would result in a patient's death, the patient 
alone should be able to refuse treatment, and then perhaps only if he is 
competent at the time the treatment is contemplated. The more extreme 
version of this view would hold that where someone is unable or not fully 
competent to decide for himself at the time medical treatment is needed, 
medical professionals should decide in favour of life-saving treatment. 
This result would follow regardless of the treatment choice a person would 
have made prior to an emergency and regardless of what relatives may 
claim. The rationale behind this approach is the suggestion that it is wrong 
for others to act in a manner that will probably lead to the death of a patient. 
In this case, we can see that patient autonomy is equated with 'making the 
right decision' for the patient, rather than making the decision the patient 
would have made herself. With respect, the danger of this approach is to 
compromise the surrogate's power of decision making to the extent that 
difficult decisions are taken out of that person's hands. This undermines 
the patient's wishes and religious convictions to an unacceptable degree. 
94 
95 
Eichner, above n 92, 72. 
See K F Hegland "Unauthorised Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment" 53 
California Law Review 860, 871-873. 
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The second approach looks at the patient's 'best interests'. The application 
of this approach is far from clear. It is uncertain whether the patient's 
wishes can be equated with best interests, or whether this test opens the 
door to paternalism, by allowing the decision maker to override a patient's 
wishes by considering other criteria. Such other criteria could be economic 
factors or the decision maker's own perception of the benefits and burdens 
of the proposed treatment.96 
Two formulations of the best interests test were outlined in Conroy. The 
first of these is the 'limited objective' test.97 Where there is some evidence 
of the patient's wish to forgo treatment and the surrogate is satisfied that the 
burdens of continued life with treatment outweigh the benefits of that life 
for the patient, then that decision must be honoured. The second 
formulation is related to the second. Where there is no trustworthy 
evidence of the patient's wishes, the burdens and benefits of treatment are 
weighed against each other.98 
It is submitted that the best interests test should not be followed. The 
identification of burdens and benefits is a highly speculative exercise. 
Rather, it is submitted that the substituted judgment model should 
determine whether the decision making power of a surrogate has been 
exercised appropriately. Where there is clear and convincing evidence of the 
patient's wishes, a surrogate's refusal in accordance with these wishes 
should be honoured, even when this refusal may be likely to lead to the 
death of the patient. 
Perhaps the most difficult questions relating to honouring a surrogate's 
decision will arise in relation to the grey area, where there is some, but not 
sufficient, evidence of a patient's wishes. Such a situation might occur 
when it is known that a patient belongs to a particular religious sect, but the 
strength of that patient's religious convictions are not known. In the 
situation where there is little or no evidence of a patient's desires, it is 
submitted that the presumption should be in favour of treatment. Erring on 
96 
97 
98 
See R Macklin "Treatment Refusals: Autonomy, Paternalism and the 'Best Interest' of 
the Patient" in D W Pfaff (ed) Ethical Questions in Brain and Behaviour: Problems 
and Opportunities (Springer-Verlag, New York, 1983) 41, 45. 
Above n 89, 1232. 
Complete authority could also be given to the proxy, but it is unlikely that this 
approach could be advocated convincingly. 
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the side of life and good medical practice does not compromise patient 
autonomy. Instead, a patient's self-determination is promoted by allowing 
the patient the best possible chance to recover enough to make decisions for 
herself. 
(c) Consultation and approval 
In New Zealand, there is no mechanism for consultation and approval of a 
surrogate's decision before it takes effect. The decision of a surrogate may be 
amenable to judicial review, but such action to determine the propriety of a 
decision maker's actions may be too late for a patient if the decision has 
already been effected. Where possible then, it is suggested that some 
mechanism for consultation and approval of the surrogate's decision is 
desirable. 
Several questions arise in relation to consultation and approval processes: 
Should the court be involved? Should an ethics committee be involved? 
Should there need to be concurrence between the surrogate and the opinion 
of the attending doctor before a decision can be implemented? What is to 
happen to the patient in the event of a disagreement? 
At least two different approaches to consultation and approval procedures 
have been set out by United States courts. In In re Quinlan,99 the court held 
that a decision to terminate medical treatment can be made by a patient's 
natural guardian,10° but this decision must be made with the concurrence of 
the patient's doctor, family and an ethics committee. 
These requirements can be contrasted with the procedure set out in In re 
Conroy,101 which would require resort to the court to obtain a judicial 
finding that the patient lacks competence to make a treatment decision. This 
finding must be supported by two examining doctors. Once a finding of 
'incompetence' is made, a guardian who has been appointed by a court after 
an assessment of that persons bona fides and qualifications to be chosen, 
may make a decision for the patient to refuse treatment. This decision 
99 
100 
101 
Above n 77, 664. 
Typically the patient's next of kin. 
Above n 89, 1241. 
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requires the concurrence of two independent doctors, the patient's attending 
physician, the patient's family and an investigating ombudsman. 
Both the Quinlan and the Conroy decisions may be criticised for their 
impractical approaches to the religious patient's situation. Those cases were 
decided on their particular facts. Both involved patients in irreversible 
comas and thus, the delay caused by their thoroughgoing requirements was 
not at issue. Where a surrogate is appointed for the religious patient, there 
will often be little time for this process to be complied with. This militates 
against the application of a mandatory requirement of approval by either 
the courts or an ethics committee. 
Before approval should even be considered, consultation between the 
surrogate and the patient's attending doctor should take place. If there is 
disagreement between the doctor and the surrogate, then the surrogate 
should be able to seek approval1°2 for a treatment decision from an ethics 
committee, or if it is critical that a decision be reached immediately, by an 
independent doctor. However, it must always be borne in mind that the 
surrogate is standing in the shoes of the patient and the medical profession 
should remember that there is no justifiable power of veto of a surrogate's 
decision where that decision represents what would have been the choice of 
the patient. 
Even if there is ample time for approval to be rendered by a court, rather 
than an ethics committee, it must be asked whether the court is actually the 
best forum for making approving a surrogate's decision.103 Two conflicting 
views about whether the courts should be involved in the decision making 
procedure are apparent. In the Quinlan case, it was held that this would be a 
"gratuitous encroachment" on the medical profession's competence.104 This 
stands in stark contrast with the opinion of another United States court in 
Saikewics,105 where it was held that the courts can best furnish the 
"detached but passionate investigation appropriate to [this] critical matter" 
and that the courts best reflect the morality and conscience of society. For the 
reasons stated above in Part III B 2(a) , it is submitted that the Quinlan court 
102 And the doctor should be able to seek to set this decision aside, if there is reason to 
suggest that the decision is not appropriate. 
103 See above, text ton 88. 
104 Above n 78, 547. 
105 370 NE 2d 435, 440. 
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made the better assessment of the role of the court in approving surrogate 
decisions and for this reason the utilisation of an ethics committee is 
recommended when approval is required. 
(d) Summary 
In general, where an incapacitated patient would have refused medical 
treatment on religious grounds, it is desirable that this refusal be given 
effect. This may require better legislative protection for advance 
directives.1°6 In particular, it is suggested that the powers of welfare 
guardians and proxy decision makers should be extended to include the 
power to refuse medical treatment, even where this refusal could threaten 
the life or health of a patient. 
Respecting any patient's wishes also dictates that the decision of a surrogate 
should reflect the decision that the patient would have made, if able . 
Difficulties will arise where there is little or no evidence of a patient's wish 
to undergo or refuse treatment. In those situations, identifying the patient's 
wishes is a speculative, indeed artificial exercise. In such a case there should 
be a presumption in favour of treatment.107 
106 
107 
See R Tobin "The Incompetent Patient's Right to Die: Time for Legislation Allowing 
for Advance Directives" [1993] NZ Recent Law Review 103, 121 and also below Part 
III B 1. 
This presumption may be rebutted. Where, for example, a patient is in a persistent 
vegetative state, treatment may not be required. This fact situation falls outside the 
scope of this paper. 
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IV TREATMENT REFUSALS MADE BY OR ON BEHALF OF 
CHILDREN 
A related and overlapping area of law concerns treatment refusals on 
religious grounds that are made by or on behalf of children. In these 
circumstances, the additional rights of both parents and children must be 
considered. The line between the age at which a child can validly give or 
withhold consent and the age at which that decision must be made by a 
child's parent is difficult to draw. This chapter outlines the nature and scope 
of parental authority and the emerging jurisprudence on children's rights to 
self determination, which is reflected in the landmark decision of the House 
of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Board)OB 
A Parental Authority 
The common law on parental authority reflects the importance of the 
nuclear family in Western societies. Parents are granted great power over 
their minor children. Generally, parents have the primary responsibility for 
the upbringing and development of their children.109 They may, within 
bounds, deprive their children of both liberty and property.110 It is said that 
the basis of this authority is the presumption that parents will act in their 
children's best interests. Looking after the best interests of their children is 
regarded as primarily a parental concern because of the natural bonds of 
affection between parents and children: 111 
108 
109 
110 
111 
[P]arents are [seen as] protectors of the child and responsible for the child's care. This 
is regarded as the 'natural role' of parents and is recognised universally in legal 
codes. · 
[1985] 4 All ER 402. 
However, the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 gives this 
authority to the family as a whole, where this is appropriate. 
In Re Clark (1962) 185 NE 2d 128, 131. 
Above n 44, 73. The best interests standard is used in the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Under art 18, parents have the "primary responsibility" 
for the upbringing and development of their children and the "best interests" of the 
child is said to be their "basic concern". Compare article 18(4) of the ICCPR which 
obliges states to respect the liberty of parents to ensure the education of their 
children in conformity with their own religious and moral convictions. 
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Parental authority encompasses the right of parents to make decisions on 
behalf of their minor children. Parents are empowered as surrogate decision 
makers because it is thought that they possess what children lack in the 
capacity required to make difficult choices. 
Having rights often goes hand in hand with duties and parental duties may 
be seen as the concomitant of parental rights. The refusal of treatment by 
parents could be classified as engaging in a positive act that is harmful or 
detrimental to the health of their child or as a failure to act in a way which 
is medically recognised that is harmful or detrimental to their child. If this 
latter characterisation of a parent's refusal is accepted, then an argument 
may be advanced that section 152 of the Crimes Act would be breached by a 
parent who refused treatment on behalf of a child, where this refusal 
threatens the life of a child. Section 152(1) imposes a legal duty on parents 
and persons in the place of parents to provide children under the age of 16 
with the necessaries of life: 
Every one who as a parent or person in place of a parent is under a legal duty to 
provide necessaries for any child under the age of 16 years, being a child in his actual 
custody, is criminally responsible for omitting without lawful excuse to do so, 
whether the child is helpless or not, if the death of the child is caused, or if his life 
is endangered or his health permanently injured, by such omission. 
It has been held by the courts that the necessaries of life includes medical 
treatment.112 If there is a lawful excuse for a parent's failure to provide a 
minor child with the necessaries of life, then that parent will not be judged 
to be criminally responsible for the omission. Lawful excuse is a phrase that 
is incapable of precise legal definition:113 
Their Lordships doubt if it is possible to define the expression 'lawful excuse' in a 
comprehensive and satisfactory manner ... [I]t would be undesirable to do so ... [E]ach 
case requires to be examined on its individual facts. 
It was suggested in the Burney case that the absence of negligence might 
provide the basis for a finding of lawful excuse.I 14 An expansive 
112 
113 
114 
See R v Moore [1954) NZLR 893 and R v Burney [1958] NZLR 745. 
Burney, above n 110, 753, citing a passage from Wong Pooh Yin v Public Prosecutor 
(1915) AC 93 with approval. 
Burney, above n 110, 753-754. 
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interpretation of lawful excuse is urged in Adams on Criminal Law and 
Practice.1 15 
In Burney, the following propositions were laid out concerning the mens 
rea required to sustain a conviction for failure to provide the necessaries of 
life. In that case, it was decided that there need not be an intentional 
omission to provide the necessaries of life; negligence will be sufficient. The 
requisite negligence must be of a high degree for liability to accrue under the 
Burney test. A lack of awareness that a child needs medical advice might be 
negligence and this ignorance cannot be invoked as a lawful excuse if 
negligence is proven.116 
Section 152 does not impose criminal responsibility wherever there is an 
omission to perform one's legal duty to provide the necessaries of life. In 
order to be criminally responsible, the omission must be both "without 
lawful excuse" and result in the death of the person, or endangering that 
person's life or permanently injuring that person's health. Criminal 
responsibility will only occur in these circumstances. 
Section 152(2) sets out a maximum penalty of 7 years for failure to observe 
this duty without lawful excuse, where this neglect causes danger to life or 
permanent injury to health. Where death is caused by a failure to provide 
the necessaries of life, then section 160(2)(b) of the Crimes Act provides that 
this is culpable homicide.1 17 Section 160(2)(b) provides that homicide is 
culpable when it consists of the killing of any person by an omission 
without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal duty. 
The effect of these provisions may be to limit the scope of parental 
authority. It could be argued that parental decision making rights do not 
115 
116 
117 
J B Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law and Practice in New Zealand (Brooker & 
Friend, Wellington, 1992) para CA 151. 07. In relation to a doctor's duty to provide 
the necessaries of life, there will be a lawful excuse for a breach of duty where the 
doctor acts in good faith and in accordance with good medical practice: Auckland 
Area Health Board, Above n 36, 252-253. 
However, the correct approach is to regard section 152 as imposing a duty absent any 
mens rea. Thus, it should be asked whether the duty was performed. Criminal 
responsibility then flows from "omitting" to perform the duty. According to comments 
made in Adams on Criminal Law, above n 113, mens rea should be looked at as going to 
the question of whether there is an omission without lawful excuse. 
Section 158 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that homicide is "the killing of a human 
being by another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever". Culpable 
homicide is then defined in s 160 of the Act. 
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extend to allow the refusal of medical treatment where this could cause a 
child's death, endanger that child's life, or cause permanent injury to that 
child's health. However, this argument has never been presented to a New 
Zealand court. This may be because the courts have been willing to override 
a parent's decision to refuse medical treatment for their child by invoking 
section 9 of the Guardianship Act 1968. This section enables the court to 
make a child its ward. It may then order treatment for the child against the 
wishes of its parents. The use of the court's jurisdiction under section 9 is 
considered in the next chapter of this paper. 
B Children's Rights 
The notion that children should be seen but not heard is borne out in law 
throughout most of recent history. Dharmananda notes that traditionally, 
the voice of children has been either denied, ignored or subsumed 
economic or filial duties.1 18 Now, there is an increasing awareness of the 
special individual needs of children and the rights that should be accorded 
to them if they are to be given the chance to develop. Thus, parental rights 
may dwindle as a child matures, although they do not evaporate entirely 
until the age of maturity.119 
The House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health 
Authority120 declared that the law should recognise a child's choices if that 
child is sufficiently mature to make decisions. Lord Scarman declared that 
parental rights "exist only so long as they are needed for the protection of 
the person and property of the child".1 21 This is because, as Lord Fraser 
explained: 
118 
119 
120 
121 
Parental rights do not exist for the benefit of the parent. They exist for the benefit of 
the child. 
Above n 40, 23. 
See the comments of Lord Denning in Hewer v Bryant [1969] 3 All ER 578, 582, where 
he stated that parental authority is a dwindling right which the courts will 
hesitate to enforce against the wishes of the child, the older he is . "It starts with a 
right of control and ends with little more than advice". 
Above n 108. 
Above n 108, 420. 
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In 1989, the United Nations adopted a Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.122 This Convention recognises the importance of the human rights of 
children and the fact that these rights had not been adequately defined and 
protected in 'general' human rights documents such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 14 of the Convention 
provides for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. According to 
this provision, states are to respect the rights and duties of parents "to 
provide direction to the child in the exercise of [this right] in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child". 
It would seem that this provision is intended to operate in the same 
manner as the Gillick decision. This would allow allow the decisions of 
children to be respected wherever evidence can be shown that a child is 
sufficiently developed to make them. 
The Gillick case is not directly binding on New Zealand courts, and the 
application of Gillick in the New Zealand courts has not yet been tested. 
Whether the Gillick competent child exists for the purposes of New Zealand 
law is unclear. The Guardianship Act 1968 specifically deals with a child's 
ability to consent to medical treatment in section 25. 
Section 25(1) provides that every person over the age of 16 can validly 
consent to medical treatment, but it is silent on the question of whether or 
not those under the age of 16 can ever effectively consent or refuse to 
submit to medical treatment. Only minors who have never been married 
are expressly given the right to refuse medical treatment.123 However, 
section 11 of the NZBORA gives every one the right to refuse medical 
treatment. The applicability of section 11 is subject to the operation of 
section 5 of the NZBORA.1 24 It is unlikely that the decision of a Gillick 
competent minor child would be validly limited by the application of 
section 5 of the NZBORA. But in cases where a child's competence to make 
an informed treatment decision is uncertain, the line between respecting 
and overriding that decision is fine. However, this may be a necessary 
122 Also in 1989, the Human Rights Committee adopted a "General Comment" on art 24 of 
the ICCPR which deals with children's rights. 
123 See s 25(2) of the Guardianship Act. 
124 See below, text ton 175. 
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concomitant of greater respect for the differing developmental processes of 
children. 
According to section 33(1), the Guardianship Act takes effect as a code except 
as otherwise provided in the Act. The definition of guardianship in section 
3 provides for the express reservation of the common law. In relation to 
treatment decisions, Gillick may have room to operate because of section 
25(5)(a) which saves the common law relating to the non-necessity of 
consent. Section 25(5)(a) provides that:125 
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect any enactment or rule of law 
whereby in any circumstances-
( a) No consent or no express consent is necessary ... 
Austin 126 argues that there is also room for the operation of Gillick under 
section 23(3) which provides that:127 
(3) Where the consent of any other person to any medical... procedure (including 
a blood transfusion) to be carried out on a child is necessary or sufficient, 
consent may be given-
(a) By a guardian of the child; or 
(b) If there is no guardian in New Zealand or no such guardian can be 
found with reasonable diligence or is capable of giving consent, by a 
person in New Zealand who has been acting in the place of a parent; 
The operation of Gillick would require an assessment of a child's 
competence. This requires both an understanding of the proposed treatment 
and an appreciation of the likely effect of this treatment on family 
relationships. This requirement is said to contextualise the power of a 
Gillick competent child to consent to medical treatment within the family 
unit.128 An assessment of the competence of any person is difficult to 
determine, but in the case of a child this difficulty may be exacerbated. An 
adult is presumed to be competent, but it must be proven that a minor is 
125 
126 
127 
128 
W Atkin "Parents and Children: Mrs Gillick in the House of Lords" [1986] NZLJ 90, 
92. 
G Austin "Righting a Child's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Section 11 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights and the Gillick Competent Child" (1992) 7 Otago LR 
578,581. 
My emphasis. 
Above n 126, 593. 
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Gillick competent. An assessment of Gillick competence could easily be 
skewed if the decision of a child is unconventional. 
In addition to this, United Kingdom Court of Appeal has now held that the 
Gillick competent child can consent but not refuse to submit to medical 
treatment. In Re R,129 Lord Donaldson said:130 
[A Gillick competent] child can consent [to medical treatment], but if he or she 
declines to do so or refuses, consent can be given by someone else who has parental 
rights and responsibilities. 
Lord Donaldson reaffirmed his commitment to the principle he laid down 
in Re R in Re W.131 In Re W, a Gillick competent child's right to refuse 
medical treatment was considered. The court held that the court could 
override this decision in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to refuse 
treatment on behalf of minors. However, Lord Donaldson, in the minority 
on this point, opined that no minor has the right to refuse consent in the 
first place. His Lordship's analysis in the cases of Re R and Re W is patently 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Gillick decision and it is submitted that 
his reasoning should not be followed by the New Zealand courts. Thus, 
prima facie, it should be recognised that a Gillick competent child has the 
same power to refuse medical treatment as that of an adult. 
There is a statutory exception to the right of a child to refuse medical 
treatment under section 126B of the Health Act 1956. This section provides 
that the leave of the High Court must be obtained before civil or criminal 
proceedings can be brought against any doctor who administers a blood 
transfusion to a person under 20 without consent if certain conditions are 
satisfied.132 Section 126B is an express limitation on the right to refuse 
129 
130 
131 
132 
[1991] 4 All ER 177. 
Above n 129, 180. 
Above n 66, 637. 
First, in the doctor's opinion, the transfusion must have been necessary to save the life 
of the patient or to prevent permanent injury to his physical or mental health, or to 
save him from prolonged and avoidable pain and suffering. That opinion must also be 
reasonable. In addition to this, reasonable attempts must have been made to obtain 
consent to the transfusion or the circumstances must have been such that it was 
necessary to administer the transfusion promptly and it was impractical in the time 
available to obtain consent. Finally, it must have been reasonable in all the 
circumstances to administer the transfusion. In these circumstances, children may not 
be able to refuse blood transfusions. 
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medical treatment on religious grounds, and although it is in violation of 
this right, cannot be knocked down because of the operation of section 4 of 
the NZBORA.133 
133 Section 4 of the NZBORA provides that: "No court shall, in relation to any 
enactment .. . [h]old any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed ... or .. . 
(d]ecline to apply any provision of the enactment by reason only that he provision is 
inconsistent with any provision o this Bill of Rights". 
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V STATE INTERESTS 
Prima fade it is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who 
has the final say about whether or not to undergo treatment. This requires 
the greatest possible protection to be given to the individual in the 
furtherance of that individual's desires.1 34 Yet the state may interfere with 
this decision in an appropriate case. 
In exercising its governmental power, the court should not intervene with a 
treatment refusal made on religious grounds unless there is a compelling 
reason to do so. These reasons and their sufficiency in relation to overriding 
a patient's decision are discussed in this chapter. 
A The Preservation of Life 
However sacred life may be, fair social comment admits that certain aspects of life 
are properly held to be more important than life itself. Such proud and honourable 
motivations are long entrenched in society, whether it be for patriotism in war, duty 
by law enforcement officers, protection of the life of a spouse, son or daughter, death 
before dishonour, death before loss of liberty, or religious martyrdom. Refusal of 
medical treatment on religious grounds is such a value.135 
No one would doubt the importance society attributes to the principle of 
sanctity of life. The state has an indisputable interest in the preservation of 
life. This is reflected in a plethora of different statutes which provide for, 
inter alia, the state's provision of police power, cycle helmets, gambling, 
alcoholism and drug abuse. This state interest is commonly based upon the 
premise that all lives are valuable. This is reflected in section 8 of the 
NZBORA, which provides that: 
134 
135 
No one shall be deprived of life except upon such grounds as are established by law 
and are consistent with the rules of fundamental justice. 
Erickson v Dilgard (1962) 252 NYS 2d 705. 
Malette, above n 24, 326, where Robins J A cited with approval a passage from the 
judgment of Donnelly J in the court below (Malette v Shulman {1987) 47 DLR (4th) 18, 
47). 
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In international law, provisions similar to section 8 have been interpreted 
as requiring positive state action to protect life. However, this interpretation 
must be read in the context that this requirement was made. In its general 
comments regarding the interpretation of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee discussed the 
obligation of the state to provide positive action against, for example, 
allowing the creation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it is 
questionable whether section 8 could extend far enough to compel positive 
state action to prevent a patient refusing medical treatment where this 
could be life threatening. 
Section 8 aside, the importance of each individual's life is said to preclude 
allowing a patient to refuse lifesaving medical treatment because it is argued 
that letting a patient die demeans society's overall respect for life.1 36 But a 
counter-argument to this point may be raised. Respect for life springs from 
treating everyone as a unique individual.1 37 Honouring a patient's choice to 
refuse medical treatment need not be regarded as a deprecation of life. There 
is no deprecation of life involved just because the religious patient's refusal 
of treatment is regarded as silly or inconsequential to others. Rather, it may 
be seen as a reflection of concern for the individual instead of as a disdain 
for life. The rejection of medical treatment on religious grounds is a 
principled decision based upon deeply rooted religious convictions. 
Moreover, such a decision is unlikely to endanger the lives of others. This is 
not the kind of decision that, if allowed to stand, would encourage others to 
blindly refuse treatment. 
The state's interest in preserving life is often also linked to an interest in the 
prevention of suicide.138 The law has ceased to criminalise both suicide and 
attempted suicide. It is now recognised that the criminal law is not 
appropriate in the context of suicide.139 However, society's concern about 
136 
137 
138 
139 
See, for example, Hegland, above n 95, 866-867. 
C Goldberg "Choosing Life After Death: Respecting Religious Beliefs and Moral 
Convictions in Near Death Decisions" (1988) 39 Syracuse Law Review 1197, 1239; N L 
Cantor "A Patient's Decision to Decline Lifesaving Medical Treatment: Bodily 
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life" 26 Rutgers Law Review 228, 244. 
Cantor, above n 21, 45. 
Deterrence and punishment are hardly meaningful concepts in connection with 
suicide. 
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suicide is still reflected in law.140 Thus, it may be said that society still has an 
interest in preventing suicide. It is difficult to argue that refusing life 
preserving treatment on religious grounds amounts to suicide. Suicide is a 
self destructive course that is calculated to bring about death. It requires a 
specific intent to die. Just knowing that death will follow from a treatment 
refusal does not amount to a specific intent to die.141 
When a refusal is based upon firmly held religious convictions, it is difficult 
to conclude that the patient has any specific intent to die. Typically, the 
patient has no wish to die and hopes that she will be healed. The religious 
patient is merely adhering to the tenets of his religion in rejecting medical 
treatment. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that the refusal of medical treatment 
on religious grounds is tantamount to suicide.142 Even if it were, anti-
suicide laws do not dictate that life is a supreme value. The principle of 
sanctity of life has always coexisted with, inter alia, the state's authority to 
wage war.143 
B The Protection of Public Health 
There are precedents in the United States for limitations of religious liberty 
on this ground, for example, legislation prohibiting snake handling rituals. 
In Lawson v Commonwealth,144 a state court held that: 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
For example, prohibitions still exist against aiding and abetting suicide and people 
are often hospitalised after they attempt suicide in order that they undergo 
psychological scrutiny. 
The law would be loath to treat people who heroically risk their life to save others 
as suicidal. 
See, for example, the reasoning of Judge Skelly Wright in Application of the 
President and Director of Georgetown College Inc (1964) 377 US 978, 1008-1009, where 
the Judge said that (where attempted suicide is illegal) a person cannot refuse 
medical treatment when death is likely to ensue without it. His honour dismissed 
the argument that there is no specific intent to die in this case as a "quibble". Some 
courts in the United States have even gone further to suggest that treatment may be 
refused because a patient has a personal distaste for life where life may have become 
a personal hell for that patient. Arguably in these cases a patient has a specific 
intent to die. See Cantor, above n 138. 
And in the case of In Re J [1991] 2 WLR 140 the United Kingdom Court of Appeal 
stated that although there was a strong presumption in favour of the preservation of 
life, no principle no principle could override the paramountcy of the ward's best 
interests. 
(1942) 164 SW 2d 972, 974. 
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[T]he Federal constitution does not preclude a state from enacting a law prohibiting 
the practice of a religious rite which endangers the lives, health or safety of the 
participants, and other persons. 
Religious liberty and the right of an individual to refuse medical treatment 
may be overridden in order to protect public health. The state's purpose in 
asserting this interest is not to save the life of the patient who is refusing 
treatment, but to prevent the spread of disease into the community:145 
The right to practise religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community 
to communicable diseases. 
In Jacobson v Massachusetts,146 a compulsory vaccination law was held to be 
valid because, in that case, religious liberty was overbalanced by the state's 
interest in protecting its inhabitants from a dangerous and contagious 
disease. Where public health is threatened, the danger caused to society by a 
treatment refusal may be sufficient to outweigh a religious patient's rights. 
C The Protection of Third Parties 
The state may attempt to compel medical treatment where innocent third 
parties may suffer from a patient's refusal. In Application of the President 
and Director of Georgetown College Inc,147 a mother with a young child was 
not able to refuse a blood transfusion because: 
145 
146 
147 
The state, as parens patriae, will not allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it 
should not allow this most voluntary of abandonments. The patient has a 
responsibility to the community to care for her infant. Thus, the people have an 
interest in preserving the life of the mother. 
Prince v Massachusetts (1944) 321 US 158, 166-167. 
(1905) 197 us 11, 24-31. 
(1964) 377 us 978. 
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Two separate rationales have been advanced in support of this state 
interest.148 The first is the prevention of psychological harm to the religious 
patient's surviving children. While this may seem to be a compelling 
reason to override a treatment decision, its application is uncertain because 
the emotional impact of a parent's death on a child will vary from case to 
case.149 The second rationale is the prevention of economic harm to the 
state. This is said to arise when a child is made a public ward. Obviously this 
can only apply where a solo parent wishes to refuse lifesaving treatment.150 
The sufficiency of this latter rationale is also questionable because it is 
unlikely that many people will refuse medical treatment on religious 
grounds. For this reason the economic burden placed upon the state is likely 
to be slight. 
The argument that was postulated in Georgetown has been invoked to 
protect unborn children where a pregnant woman refuses medical 
treatment.1 51 In this situation, the rationale behind treating an expectant 
mother is to allow the unborn child a chance at life. This argument was 
made in Raleigh-Pitkin Hospital v Anderson, 152 in the context of a 
pregnancy in its thirty-second week. This is an unjustifiable infringement 
on the mother's liberty that is probably best left to more explicit 
consideration at another time. 
An even more difficult argument to run concerns the protection of a third 
party who cannot be described as innocent. In R v Blaue,153 a stab victim was 
taken to hospital after losing a large quantity of blood. A blood transfusion 
was refused and the victim died shortly thereafter. It could be suggested that 
the state should override the victims choice to stop those like Blaue from 
being convicted of manslaughter. That the state should have an interest in 
this case is flawed logic. The nature of Blaue's original action would not be 
changed by compelling victims to be transfused against their wishes. The 
consequence might change, but this does nothing to stop serious crime 
being committed. This has no preventative or deterrent effect. The only 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
See Cantor, above n 137, 251; and R M Bym,"Compulsory Lifesaving Medical 
Treatment for the Competent Adult" (1975) 44 Fordham Law Review 1, 33. 
Cantor, above n 137, 251. 
DJ Sharpe and R F Hargest "Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients" (1968) 36 
Fordham Law Review 695,697. 
Above n 137, 1228. 
(1964) 201 A 2d 537. 
[1975] 3 All ER 446. 
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possible justification for transfusing the victim is to prevent long sentences 
being imposed which are a drain on the state. In the context, this is an 
insufficient reason. In any event, the court in Blaue decided that Blaue had 
to take his victim as he found her, and he was convicted of manslaughter. 
D The Protection of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession 
The health of my patient will be my first consideration.154 
The Hippocratic Oath155 establishes in its essence that medical treatment 
should be for the benefit of the patient. One aspect of this is that doctors 
ought to act in the best interests of patients. We may extrapolate from this a 
duty on the part of the profession to determine what the welfare of the 
patient requires and then treat him or her accordingly. If a paternalistic 
interpretation of the patient's benefit is adopted, then curing the patient's 
condition will be considered of primary importance to the profession, to the 
exclusion or diminution of other relevant concerns. However, it can also be 
argued that the patient's best interests should be served by maximising the 
patient's chances of getting the best possible outcome in terms of his or her 
154 
155 
From the Geneva Convention Code of Medical Ethics - a modern version of the 
Hippocratic Oath adopted by the World Medical Association in 1949. The full text to 
the Geneva Declaration is as follows : "I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life 
to the service of humanity; I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude that 
is their due; I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity; The health of 
my patient will be my first consideration; I will respect which are confided in me; I 
will maintain by all the means in my power, the honour and the noble traditions of 
the medical profession; My colleagues will be my brothers; I will not permit 
considerations of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing to 
intervene between my duty and my patient; l will maintain the utmost respect for 
human life from the time of conception; even under threat; I will not use my medical 
knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity; I make these promises solemnly, freely 
and upon my honour. 
The Hippocratic Oath was originally promulgated in order to curb the activities of 
doctors who had been administering medical treatment allegedly for the betterment 
of patient health but without proper training or regulation. The relevant part of the 
oath reads as follows: " The regimen I adopt shall be for the benefit of the patients 
according to my ability and judgement, and not for their hurt or for any wrong ... 
Whatsoever house I enter, there I will go for the benefit of the sick, refraining from 
all wrongdoing or corruption ... Whatsoever things I see or hear concerning the life of 
men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which ought not to be 
noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred secrets. 
Pure and holy will I keep my Life and Art. (emphasis added) 
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life and purposes.156 Although historically, doctors have even trained to 
use all available methods to sustain life, maximising a patient's welfare 
should be considered from the perspective of the patient. 
In a society that has become increasingly aware of individual rights, 
particularly the right to make one's own choices, the role of the doctor 
increasingly extends beyond the therapeutic.157 As a result of this, medical 
professionals are often faced with a difficult ethical problem. Is respecting a 
treatment refusal where the consequence may be death to the patient 
anathema to doctors, who have historically been trained to use all available 
methods to sustain life? This is just one of a number of difficult medical 
decisions that a doctor must make. 
It is submitted that the general ability of a patient to consent to treatment 
and to refuse treatment takes the ethical responsibility from the practitioner. 
Concerns for the unobstructed exercise of medical judgment should not 
prevail. The doctor's quandary is more apparent than real, because she must 
honour the patient's wishes. The choice is not the doctor's to make. The 
doctor has no duty in relation to protecting the patient's health against her 
wishes, despite paternalistic suggestions that one should exist.158 
156 
157 
158 
Campbell, Gillett & Jones, above n 44. 
This may be particularly so in cases where a doctor is asked to withdraw, rather 
than withhold treatment. However, a discussion of this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Aboven 95. 
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E Overriding Parental Authority 
Neither the rights of parenthood nor the rights of parents to bring up their 
children according to their choice of religion are incapable of limitation. The 
family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest. The state has a 
wide range of power for overriding parental authority in situations where a 
child's life or health might be affected. In DGSW v M ,159 Tompkins J 
recognised that the court has power to override a parent's decision where 
this could save a child's life under both section 9 of the Guardianship Act 
and as part of its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction. 
Under section 9 of the Guardianship Act 1968 ("the Guardianship Act"), the 
High Court can order that an unmarried child under 20 years old be placed 
under the guardianship of the court. An application under section 9 can be 
made by a parent, guardian or near relative of the child160; the Director 
General of Social Welfare;161 the child in question162 or anyone who obtains 
the leave of the High Court.163 
The High Court has extensive powers in relation to its wards. They extend 
to include the approval or prevention of the performance of medical 
treatment. In Re p164 Ellis J was decided that:165 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
[T]he powers set out in the Guardianship Act 1968 clearly anticipate that in 
appropriate cases orders will be made for the transfusion of children that are 
directly in conflict with the wishes and sincerely held beliefs of the parents. In 
circumstances of real and substantial risk of death the wishes of the parent can only 
be one of the factors weighed against the obligation of the Courts to determine the 
interests of the children. 
(1991)8 FRNZ 498, 503. 
Section 9(2)(a) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
Section 9(2)(b) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
Section 9(2)(c) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
Section 9(2)(d) of the Guardianship Act 1968. 
[1992] NZFLR 94. See also s 126B of the Health Act 1956. See also Re C (1992) 9 FRNZ 
570. In that case, the jurisdiction of the court to make an order that a child be 
transfused under both the court's inherent parens patriae jurisdiction and s 9 of the 
Guardianship Act was unsuccessfully challenged by the child's parents. 
Above n 164, 96. 
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Section 23(1) of the Guardianship Act provides that the welfare of the child 
should be the paramount consideration in determining whether that child 
should become a ward of the court and in determining whether consent to 
medical treatment should be given by the courts. 
The second weapon in the court's armoury which can be used to override 
parental authority is the court's inherent duty as parens patriae. The parens 
patriae jurisdiction is based on the "obvious necessity that the law should 
place somewhere the care of individuals who cannot take care of 
themselves, particularly in cases where it is feared that some care should be 
thrown around them".166 This jurisdiction is preserved by section 17 of the 
Judicature Act 1908 and may be exercised in relation to minors.167 
The authority of the state to act as parens patriae is not nullified if parents 
can ground their refusal on a claim to control a child's religious upbringing. 
The court can override decisions made by parents which would expose a 
minor child to ill health or death equally by the use of wardship procedures 
or by the use of its parens patriae jurisdiction. 
Whether the court should act under its inherent jurisdiction or under the 
wardship provisions of the Guardianship Act was a question considered in 
DGSW v M. Tompkins J said the appropriate mechanism depends on the 
individual circumstances of each case. His honour remarked that where 
consent is sought for a specific single treatment such as a single operation, it 
is more appropriate for the courts to act under its inherent jurisdiction. He 
then contrasted the single specific interest with the oversight of continuous 
treatments likely to extend over a long period of time. In that case, the 
wardship provisions would be more appropriately exercised because this 
ensures the continued involvement of the court.168 
It is submitted that the use of the court to override a parent's decision to 
refuse medical treatment in the ways which have been suggested above are 
entirely appropriate. Children should not be sacrificed for their parents' 
166 
167 
168 
Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1, 20. 
It may also be resorted to in relation to the persons and estates of 'idiots', mentally 
disordered persons and persons of unsound mind. 
Aboven 159. 
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religious beliefs. They should be allowed to grow up and decide for 
themselves whether they are willing to die for a religion:169 
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well rounded growth 
of young people into full maturity as citizens with all this implies ... Parents may be 
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free in 
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached 
the age of full legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 
169 Prince v Massachusetts, above n 145, 168-170. 
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VI HOW SHOULD COMPETING CLAIMS BE RESOLVED? 
Often, judges must make decisions against the background of their 
knowledge that upholding the patient's decision may lead to the death of 
that person. This may have something to do with the readiness of the court 
to override treatment decisions for reasons which sometimes can only be 
described as spurious.170 This approach to judicial reasoning pays lip service 
to patient autonomy and the patient's religious convictions. A consequence 
of this is that careful attention must be given to the balancing of competing 
claims in this area. 
A The Hann Principle 
Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.171 
No right is more sacred, or more carefully guarded by the common law than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of 
law.1 72 
The above quotations illustrate the proposition that the common law will 
defer to religious freedom and the right to self determination unless there is 
a compelling reason to restrict an individual's liberty. For example, 
interference may be justified where the exercise of these rights causes harm 
to others: 173 
170 
171 
172 
173 
The anguish of the court was well expressed in the decision of Supreme Court of New 
York State in Powell v Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center (1965) 267 NYS 2d 
450, 452: "Never before had my judicial robe weighed so heavily on my shoulders ... I 
knew that no release - no legal absolution - would absolve me if I, speaking for the 
court, answered 'No' to the question 'Am I my brother's keeper?' This woman wanted 
to live. I could not let her die!" 
Wisconsin v Yoder (1972) 406 US 205, 215. 
Union Pacific Railway v Botsford (1891) 141 US 250, at p 251. 
Jacobson v Massachusetts (1905) 197 US 11, 26. 
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Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognises 
the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or 
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. 
According to the harm principle, interference with individual rights can 
only occur where harm to others is threatened. As Burke said, "Liberty, too 
must be limited in order to be possessed".174 Thus, the protection of public 
health and of innocent third parties may have to be balanced against the 
rights which could be invoked by the religious patient. This moderate 
course requires that state intervention should be limited to what is really 
necessary for the protection of freedom. 
B The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
In the New Zealand context, the starting point for assessing whether a 
religious patient's treatment refusal should be honoured is the NZBORA. 
This Act affirms and protects the rights and freedoms contained within it 
against unconstitutional state action. Section 3 provides that: 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done -
(a) By the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power or duty 
conferred or imposed on that person by or pursuant to law. 
It has been suggested that the common law should be subject to the 
application of the Act under section 3(a).175 If this is so, then decisions of the 
judiciary must be made consistently with the rights and freedoms affirmed 
in the Act. In respect to a treatment refusal made on religious grounds, it 
has been shown above that if this decision is not honoured, sections 11, 15 
and possibly also section 20 are the main rights which are prima fade 
violated. Any limitations on the rights that are enunciated in that 
174 
175 
As quoted in Department of Justice Briefing Papers for the Minister of Justice (vol 1, 
"Key Policy Issues" 1990) 1. 
See A S Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law 
Litigation" [1991) NZLJ 261. 
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legislation are only valid if section 5 is first satisfied. Section 5 of the 
NZBORA provides that: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this 
Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
A section 5 analysis is a useful method of assessing the constitutional 
validity of a decision to override a treatment refusal by a religious patient.It 
will also indicate whether such a decision comparts with our international 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
In order to determine whether a limit is justified under section 5 it should 
be considered whether it is prescribed by law and whether it is demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
A limitation on the rights set out in the NZBORA will be prescribed by law 
unless it is arbitrary, or so vague that it is impossible to apply.176 An 
intelligible standard must be yielded by a decision to override a right 
affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. In relation to common law 
decisions of the judiciary, this requirement will be satisfied if the courts 
enunciate its reasons for overriding a treatment refusal clearly, and in a 
form that can be applied in future cases. 
Canadian jurisprudence is instructive in determining whether a limit 
should be seen as "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society".177 In R v Oakes,178 a two part test was set out. First, the limit must 
be pressing and substantial; and secondly, there must be proportionality 
between the limit on the right or freedom and the state's objective in 
implementing such a limitation. 
176 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613, 680; Osborne v Canada (Treasury Board) [1991] 2 SCR 69, 
94. 
l77 Section 5 of the New Zealand Act is largely derived from the Canadian Charter, 
which contains a virtually identical provision. 
l78 [1986] 1 SCR 103. This approach was approved in MOT v Noort/Police v Curran (1992) 
5 CRNZ 115, 138, per Richardson J. Note that in Canada (and in the judgment of 
Cooke P, who was a minority judge in the Noort decision) the Supreme Court has 
recently begun to analyse their equivalent of section 5 on an impressionistic basis: See 
D Paciocco "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated 
Bill" [1990] NZ Recent Law Review 353, 368. This does not affect the usefulness of 
applying Oakes as a checklist for assessing the constitutional validity of a decision 
to override a religious patient's treatment decision. 
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The state's objectives in overriding a treatment refusal have been set out in 
the previous chapter, where it was suggested that concerns for the 
protection of public health and the protection of innocent third parties may 
be pressing and substantial concerns. 
The second part of the Oakes test is the proportionality requirement. This 
requires a three-part analysis: 
(i) The limit on the right or freedom must be rationally connected 
to the state's objective; 
(ii) the limit must be a minimal impairment of the right or 
freedom; and 
(iii) there must be a proper balance between the limit and the 
legislative objective. 
The first part of the proportionality test simply requires a link between the 
state's objective (for example, protecting the community from the spread of 
disease) and the limitation of the right (that is to say, overriding a treatment 
refusal). The second requirement is that the right in question must be 
impaired as minimally as possible. This is not a requirement that the state 
must, in all circumstances, take the least restrictive alternative An element 
of discretion is left to the state in implementing its decisions.I 79 But an 
overly broad limitation on the right will not be constitutional. This element 
is not really applicable in the treatment refusal scenario because there is no 
range of options that could be chosen in relation to a treatment refusal. 
Either a patient is allowed to refuse treatment, or that refusal is overridden. 
There is no middle ground; no way that the right could be more minimally 
impaired. 
The final element of the proportionality test is not difficult to satisfy. It is 
unlikely that a successful argument could be advanced to say that 
overriding a treatment refusal abridges the religious patient's rights to 
religious liberty and self-determination altogether. 
179 Irwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927, 999. 
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The constitutional analysis of the rights and interests undertaken in this 
paper highlights the importance of honouring the rights of the religious 
patient to refuse medical treatment. To override at least two constitutionally 
protected rights, the sufficiency of countervailing considerations must be 
carefully analysed. The state must not offer inadequate justifications in 
order to compel treatment as these will not withstand scrutiny under 
section 5 of the NZBORA. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
From the discussion in this paper, we can draw a number of conclusions: 
1. There should be a presumption that a religiously motivated 
treatment refusal made by a competent patient should be upheld. 
2. People whose religious convictions motivate them to refuse medical 
treatment should provide specific, preferably written instructions to 
ensure their religious beliefs are respected in the event that they 
become incapacitated. 
3. A proxy decision maker or welfare guardian appointed under the 
PPPRA does not have the ability to refuse treatment on behalf of an 
incapacitated patient, even where this is what that patient would 
have wanted. It is recommended that this position should be 
amended, so that the proxy and the welfare guardian can make this 
decision for a patient. 
4. The appointment of a surrogate decision maker, where the patient 
has not made an instruction directive is shrouded in uncertainty. It is 
preferable that professional standards should dictate that a patient's 
family should be asked to consent on behalf of an incompetent 
patient, unless there is doubt about the bona fides or suitability of the 
patient's kin. In all cases where it is practicable, an ethics committee 
should be required to approve a decision not to appoint a family 
member as a surrogate. 
5. Where it appears that there is no one who can act as a surrogate, it 
may be necessary to have recourse to the courts to make some type of 
determination that relates to medical treatment. However, it would 
be preferable that this decision be left to an ethics committee. In an 
emergency situation, a doctor should be able to act as the patient's 
surrogate, and should render a treatment decision according to the 
criteria suggested below. 
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6. A surrogate decision should be based upon the substituted judgment 
model where there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient's 
wishes. Where this evidence is not available, the surrogate has no 
basis for acting and a decision should be made to err on the side of life 
and good medical practice. This decision should be reached after 
consultation with the patient's doctor. If concurrence between the 
surrogate and the doctor cannot be reached, it should be possible to 
obtain approval for a decision from an ethics committee. 
7. Gillick competent children should have the same prima facie right to 
refuse medical treatment on medical grounds as that of an adult. 
Parents of minor children who are not Gillick competent may, subject 
to section 152 of the Crimes Act 1961, make treatment choices for 
their minor children. 
8. State interests which could override a treatment refusal are subject to 
analysis under section 5 of the NZBORA and, in addition to this, 
should only be regarded as compelling if their rationale is grounded 
in the protection of harm to others. 
Medical treatment which is administered against a religious patient's will 
should not be viewed as acceptable in a society which professes to cherish 
religious freedom and self-determination. Consequently, a treatment refusal 
on religious grounds should be honoured unless an appropriate case for 
intervention can be made out. Together, the values of autonomy, religious 
liberty and the right to medical self-determination urge an anti-paternalistic 
stand on treatment refusals made on religious grounds. 
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Only where a rigorous analysis of competing rights has been undertaken, 
should a religious patient's refusal of treatment be overridden. If a person is 
rational and competent, the risks of refusing medical treatment are that 
person's alone to take, as long as the liberty of others is not infringed. In the 
words of John Stuart Mill, which are no less relevant today than in their 
original context:180 
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and 
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to 
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. 
180 John Stuart Mill On Liberty in M J Adler (ed) Great Books of the Western World 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica Ltd, Chicago, 1982) vol 43, 273. 
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